Abstract. We introduce a first order extension of GL, called ML 3 , and develop its proof theory via a proxy cut-free sequent calculus GLTS. We prove the highly nontrivial result that cut is a derived rule in GLTS, a result that is unavailable in other known first-order extensions of GL. This leads to proofs of weak reflection and the related conservation result for ML 3 , as well as proofs for Craig's interpolation theorem for GLTS. Turning to semantics we prove that ML 3 is sound with respect to arithmetical interpretations and that it is also sound and complete with respect to converse well-founded and transitive finite Kripke models. This leads us to expect that a Solovay-like proof of arithmetical completeness of ML 3 is possible.
Introduction
This paper develops the proof theory of a first-order extension of GL, the ML 3 introduced in Section 3. This logic also extends the first-order modal logic M 3 of [20, 21] that is in turn an extension of K4. To motivate the introduction of ML 3 we need briefly to explain the genesis of M 3 , which was introduced to settle a question posed in [5] that, essentially, was: "can we add to classical predicate logic so that  for classical A and B  the provability of A → B is tantamount to the shown by Vardanyan [23] , and thus is unusable as a tool to do logic with. On the other hand, ML 3 is axiomatised by its very construction, and is eminently usable. rather than adopting cut as a primitive and then trying to get rid of it, we started instead without a cut rule and proved that GTKS can simulate cut (it is a derived rule). In that respect our "cut-elimination" proof was drastically different from the ones in [11, 22] . The rule TR originated in [8, 11, 22] in the form Γ, Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ A where it was used toward obtaining a propositional modal sequent calculus system equivalent to K4. Our version was a modification aimed to fit a predicate context (dictating the presence of ∀Γ) and we included the Ψ and Φ to avoid the inclusion of weakening/strengthening primary rules, thus simplifying the cut simulation proof.
Given that one can trivially show that M 3 is sound under arithmetical interpretations, the next natural question was: can we extend this logic so that it also becomes complete with respect to such interpretations and thus serve as a predicate provability logic  and do so without sacrificing cut eliminability?
The present paper is a contribution toward precisely this direction, introducing a proper extension of M 3 , the ML 3 , via the addition of the Löb axiom schema ( A → A) → A. While we do not have yet a polished proof of arithmetical completeness to include in this paper, we nevertheless include here a key result that is expected to lead us there, namely a proof that ML 3 is sound and complete with respect to finite and converse well-founded transitive Kripke structures. Moreover, we develop the proof theory of ML 3 by introducing a sequent calculus proxy  called GLTS this time  which while it does not include cut as a primary rule, it nevertheless can simulate cut (as a derived rule). We use the freedom from cut of GLTS to show that the modal operator in ML 3 can also act  just as it did in M 3  as a "general provability operator" for classical logic in that the conservation result is preserved as we pass from M 3 to ML 3 . Related results obtained are a proof of weak reflection (essentially, if ML 3 can prove A from certain assumptions, then it can also prove A from closely related assumptions), that Craig Interpolation holds for both GTKS and GLTS, and we also prove two negative results: Neither schema A → A (strong reflection) nor A → A (strong necessitation) are provable in ML 3 . Our GLTS includes a modified "GLR" rule that we adapted from [8, 22] . This rule proves the Löb schema in this sequent calculus. The cut simulation proof that we include here has similarities to the one in [22] but is considerably more complex due to the presence of quantifiers. This time we had to borrow techniques from loc. cit. since the Schütte-like induction that we used in [15] did not work here due to the presence of the "diagonal formula" A in the modified GLR:
∀Γ, Γ, A ⊢ A Φ, Γ ⊢ A, Ψ Nevertheless, following Schütte [14] , we have chosen some seemingly "nonstandard" sequent calculus rules. Suffice it to say that our GTKS (and GLTS of the current paper) are as they should be in terms of proof power, since we have proved them to be equivalent to two semantically complete Hilbert-style systems, M 3 (and ML 3 respectively). We can now add some final remarks to our preceding discussion regarding the choice that A be always closed. Rather than accept an a priori "right way" to go about this, which would be oblivious to specific design goals, we note that our choice, which was made all the way back in [20, 21] , was goal-driven: What do we want our logic to be able do?
Well, our logic should force A to behave like ⊢ A whenever A is classical. It should also make A behave like P r( A * )  where P r is Gödel's provability predicate  to obtain an arithmetical interpretation. Neither of these two goals require one to reach inside the scope of , notwithstanding the assertion in [4] , that "At Grade 3, is allowed to attach to open formulae, as in (x > 7). This is the level needed [our italics] to combine modality with quantifiers, for we need [our italics] to say such things as 'something is such that it is necessarily greater than 7' " This assertion must be seen in the context where it is offered, for if it is applied universally, then the word "need" that occurs twice in it is too strong. The assertion applies to the use of as a necessity operator  and Quine disputes the assertion even in this context. The italicised verbs above purport to apply to all contexts. Yet, in our context  where can be at once a general and a Peano-specific provability operator  we note that in both statements "for some x, ⊢ A(. . . , x, . . .)" (classical A) and "for some x, P r( A(. . . , x, . . .) ) (modal A) is Peano provable" the result is independent of x.
Our choice of syntax for A has subsequently led to two predicate sequent calculi, GTKS and GLTS, that are cut-free and yet can each simulate the cut rule. This much cannot be said for "the more general" systems, such as QGL, that allow A to have free variables.
Our approach has led to one solution of how to add the box to classical predicate calculus and still have a usable system, with powerful proof-theoretic tools such as "cut-elimination" and Craig interpolation  for both GTKS and GLTS, using a proof that, just like that of MaeharaTakeuti, hinges on the absence of cut in both systems  and the ability to simulate classical proofs via the conservation result. It is notable that Craig Interpolation fails in other predicate modal logics (cf. [3] ). Moreover ML 3 , with its finite converse well-founded Kripke models is most likely, as we hope to prove, complete under arithmetical interpretations.
Finally, we briefly mention another choice that we made in [20, 21] , which we preserved here. This too makes eminent sense from the endresult, or design, point of view: Our Kripke semantics in loc. cit. and in the present paper, use the varying domain semantics ([4]), with one important variation: While in such semantics, "normally", ∀xA is evaluated in the current world, yet A(y) is evaluated over all worlds. As a result, ∀xA → A(y) does not evaluate as true, and that is unacceptable for our first-order logics and our intended semantics that include the goal of simulating the classical ⊢. Thus, in our case, A(y) is evaluated in the current world just as ∀xA is, and thus the "substitution axiom" (axiom (2) in 3.1) is true, as intended.
Language and terminology
This paper is a continuation of [15] , and thus it is recommended that the reader reviews the first few pages of section 1 in loc. cit. that cover the specifics of the first-order language and (some of) the terminology that will be used here. However, for convenience's sake, we will restate the following points:
• We do not include equality in our logic and we employ neither constants nor functions in its alphabet, but we do allow predicates  in particular, 0-ary predicates, that is, propositional variables. Also, as in Schütte [14] , we distinguish between bound x, y, x • Formulae are built from atomic first-order formulae by the connectives ∀, → and ⊥ and the modal .
• Our interest in a variable a (resp. x) that may or may not occur in an expression F is denoted by F [a] (resp. F [x]). • For any formula, A, ∀A will denote the (canonical) universal closure of A  "canonical" requiring the ∀x∀y . . . prefix to be sorted in ascending lexicographic order of the bound variables.
• We say that a first-order formula is classical if it does not contain the symbol.
• We say that a first-order proof is classical if all the formulae involved in the proof are classical.
• For any formula, A, A is considered to be closed. The specific formation rules that guarantee closure by are detailed in [15] . This convention, already utilised in [20, 21, 6] , is consistent with the intended semantics of the as general (classical) first-order provability: A is provable iff ∀A is. Thus, ∀ A is simply a verbose manner of writing A.
• For any set of formulae, Γ, the notations Γ and ∀Γ mean { A : A ∈ Γ} and {∀A : A ∈ Γ} respectively.
The system ML
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In [15] we showed that the proof theory of the logical axioms of the Hilbert-style formal systems BM ( [6] ) and M 3 ( [20, 21] ) can be investigated from within the Gentzen system GTKS. Indeed, GTKS, BM and M 3 are closely related with respect to deductive power. We will now introduce a new Hilbert-style formal first-order extension of GL (and of M 3 of [15] ), that we call ML 3 , and will start developing its proof theory in the next section via a proxy Gentzen system introduced there, GLTS. (7) is rendered unremarkable by the necessity of its presence: If ML 3 is to achieve conservation, that for classical A and B, if A ⊢ B, then A → B is ML 3 -provable, then it must be that A → ∀xA is ML 3 -provable since A ⊢ ∀xA classically (and, by the way, modally as well). The reader will note that this schema is a special case of the Barcan formula (schema) ∀x A → ∀xA in view of schema (3) . Neither 7 nor the general Barcan formula are adopted in QGL. Rather, QGL has as axiom schemata those of GL, augmented by the classical schemata 1-4 of 3.1.
The M 3 of [15, 20, 21] uses A → A instead of (6) and its logical axiom set is Λ ′ ∪ Λ ′ , the prime reflecting the disagreement regarding axiom (6) . As is well known, axiom group (1) allows proof by tautological implication, that is, if A, B, . . . |= taut X, then X is derivable (syntactically) from the hypotheses A, B, . . . 5 We use the following notation: [20, 21, 15] . ⊣
In the following series of lemmata we shall explore some of the properties of ML 3 and its relation to M 3 . We will use A ∧ B as an abbreviation for (A → (B → ⊥)) → ⊥. ⊣
Proof. Let the axioms of ML 3 be Λ ∪ Λ ∪ Λ (Λ as in 3.1) and the axioms of M 3 be Λ ′ ∪ Λ ′ ( [20, 21] ). Let us show the only if. We have cases:
1. A is in Λ ∪ Λ. Since both Λ and Λ ′ share axioms (1)- (5) and (7), we only need to consider the subcases where A is L(B) or L(B) (boxed or unboxed axiom (6) 
. Now apply MP to reach the sought for conclusion. 5. A = ∀xB and Γ ⊢ ML 3 B. Follows directly from the I.H.
We now turn to the if.
Again we only need to show the claim for the case
. The first case is by 3.6, and the second by 3.7 applied to the first case. 
The Gentzen system GLTS
We now introduce the earlier announced Gentzen-style system that we will prove to be equivalent to ML 3 in terms of deductive power. The formal rules (schemata) of GLTS are:
(1) Initial rules: Γ, A ⊢ ∆, A  where A is atomic 6  and Γ, ⊥ ⊢ ∆.
 as long as a, the eigenvariable of the rule, does not occur in the conclusion ("denominator") of the rule.
The Γ and ∆ in the rules are called the "side formulae" (s.f.); the resulting single formula in the "denominator" in rules (2)- (8) is the "principal formula" (p.f.) of the rule; rule (1) has A as principal formula. The single formulae displayed in the "numerators" of (2)- (8) are the "minor formulae" (m.f.). A numerator sequent is a premise while the denominator sequent is the conclusion of the rule. (3) is, intuitively, the "deduction theorem". The (arbitrary) sets Φ and Ψ in rule (8) are weakening and strengthening parts respectively (they help us easily achieve 4.4 and 4.5). For convenience's sake, let us restate the following definitions, theorems and corollaries from [15] . Whenever a proof is supplied for said results here, it will only address the modal case, since the other cases are identical to the corresponding parts in loc. cit. 6 The intuition behind the rule is evident. The requirement for atomic A facilitates the basis step of (meta)proofs by induction on the "order" of (formal) theorems, as it will soon become evident.
7 "x" is thought of as a metavariable that denotes any bound variable. 8 Cf. [8, 11, 12]  the modifications are two: a) we require the universal closure of Γ in the numerator, rather than Γ itself, which helps to simulate axiom (7) of ML 3 b) we allow the rule to introduce "weakening" and "strengthening" parts to its conclusion.
Definition 4.1 (Theorems). A theorem, or derived sequent, is defined inductively to be one of:
(1) A sequent of the type of rule (1) . We say it is derived with order 0 or that it is an axiom. (2) A sequent of the same type as in the denominator of rule (2) provided the two corresponding sequents in the numerator are also theorems. If the latter two are derived with orders m and n, then the former is derived with order 1 + max(m, n). Note. In what follows, =⇒ and ⇐⇒ are often employed inside a proof as abbreviations of the informal "if . . . then" and "iff" respectively.
Proof. By 4.4 and 4.5 it suffices to show the provability of A ⊢ A. We do induction on the complexity of A. 9 We only show the case where A is C. Then
The following are important inversion results. They say that our rules are, in some weak sense, reversible. 
Gentzen's Hauptsatz
Definition 4.8. A proof gives rise to a directed graph in a natural way. Its sequents are the graph nodes. Edges are introduced as follows: For every application of inference (2)  a "V-type" inference  we introduce two edges, one connecting the left premise, the other connecting the right premise, to the conclusion. For all other inferences applied in the proof  each an "I-type" inference  we introduce one edge that connects the premise to the conclusion. a. The end-sequent of a proof is the final (i.e. the bottommost) sequent of the proof. b. A sequence of sequents (S i ) 0 i n in a proof P is called a path iff it is so in the graph-theoretic sense: For i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, there is an edge connecting S i to S i+1 . If i < j, we say that S i is above S j in the proof and, correspondingly, S j is below S i . We say that the path (S i ) 0 i n has length n  that is, the path length equals the number of participating edges. We write l(S 0 , S n ) = n. c. A thread (of P ) is a path that connects an axiom to the end-sequent.
d. An inference I that is applied in a proof P belongs to a path (S i ) 0 i n iff it contributes an edge to the path. e. Let I be an inference rule 10 and S be a sequent. We say that I is above S if S is either the conclusion of I or is below said conclusion. If I is a GLR inference and S is a sequent, then we say that I is directly above S if I is above S and no GLR inferences belong to the path that connects the conclusion of I to S. f. Let I 1 and I 2 be two distinct inferences that belong to the same path (S i ) 0 i n in a proof P . We say that I 1 is above I 2 (I 2 is below I 1 ) in P iff I 1 contributes nodes S i and S i+1 and I 2 contributes nodes S j and S j+1 and i + 1 j. ⊣
As is usual, a Gentzen-style proof leads to a tree rather than to an undirected acyclic graph since rather than reusing nodes we use new copies (e.g., several copies of the same axiom).
Given the nomenclature introduced by the above definition we may now freely use colloquialisms such as "I is the second GLR rule above sequent S on some thread", meaning that there is a GLR rule I ′ on the thread that is directly above S, while I is directly above the premise of I ′ .
Definition 4.9 (Width [22] ). Let S = Γ ⊢ A, ∆ be a sequent in a proof P . We denote by W(S, A) the set of all rules I above S (along some thread through S) that satisfy all the following (1) I is the second GLR rule above S on the relevant thread (2) the GLR rule I ′ that is between I and S on that thread has A as its diagonal formula Definition 4.10. If S is a sequent in a proof P , then we denote by Sub S (P ) the sub-proof of P that derives S. We then define:
(1) If P is a proof and S is a sequent in P , then a cover of S in P is a set of sequents in Sub S (P ) such that each thread in Sub S (P ) contains exactly one member of the set. (2) A cover of S with the property that there are no GLR inferences in the paths between any of its members and S, is called a classical cover.
S).
(4) A cover U of S is called a maximal classical cover if U is classical and m(U ) = max{m(U ′ )| U ′ is a classical cover of S}.
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Note that for any S, {S} is a (classical) cover of S, and therefore a maximal classical cover of S always exists.
Lemma 4.11. Let P be a proof and S = Γ, A ⊢ ∆ a sequent in P , and let U = {S 1 , . . . , S n } be a maximal classical cover of S in P , then:
there is a proof ofS = Γ, ∀Σ, Σ ⊢ ∆. Let next m > 0. We examine the case where S is the conclusion of rule (2) . Thus, let the premises be
. Let us focus on S ′ : We have either S ′ ∈ U , or there is an S k ∈ U , which is above S ′ along a path
Let us take the latter case first. Then  since we omit members of U on threads that pass through S ′′  we have a proper subset of U , say U ′ , that is a maximal classical cover of S ′ . Thus m(U ′ ) < m(U ) and so, by the I.H., we have a proof of Proof. This proof is a slightly more involved version of the proof of the Hauptsatz given in [15] , the complication arising from the presence of the diagonal formula in GLR. Now, the proof is by induction on the ordinal
where c is the modified complexity of the "cut formula" A. By "modified complexity" we mean the ordinal ω · k + r where k counts occurrences and r counts the total of all →, ∀ occurrences in A. Thus (k, r) < (k + 1, r ′ ) and (k, r) < (k, r + 1) for all k, r, r ′ .
14 Thus the induction on α can be visualised as a quadruple induction: We do a primary induction on c as in the analogous proof in [15] . Induction on w = w(Γ ⊢ ∆, A) is a secondary induction  S.I.  on the width of the cut formula A that occurs to the right of ⊢. A tertiary and even a quaternary induction  T.I. and Q.I.  on derivation orders for Γ ⊢ A, ∆ (order m) and Θ, A ⊢ Φ (order n) will be called upon at appropriate points. Because of the "weights" attached to c, w, m and n, a reduction of c by 1 reduces α even if the other parameters increase. A reduction of w also reduces α as long as c does not increase.
In all inductions  P.I., S.I., T.I. and Q.I.  Γ, ∆, Θ and Φ are parameters (i.e., the P.
I.H., S.I.H., T.I.H. and Q.I.H. hold for all Γ, ∆, Θ, Φ).
First, we deal with the cases where A is not a boxed formula. The only thing we need to show is that cuts in the proof in [15] that rely on induction on the order of the derivation, i.e. tertiary and quaternary induction, do not involve a cut formula with a higher width, and thus the corresponding argument in [15] is also valid here. This task is relatively easy since a quick examination of the proof in [15] reveals that in all the cuts whose feasibility relied on induction on the order of derivation the cut formula was the original A; and since A is not boxed then the width remained at 0.
Assume now that A = C. In this case too we start with a tertiary induction, this time on the derivation order m of Γ ⊢ C, ∆.
1. Say Γ ⊢ C, ∆ is an axiom. Since C is not atomic, so is Γ, Θ ⊢ Φ, ∆.
2. We assume first that C is not the p.f. in the last rule applied to derive S = Γ ⊢ C, ∆.
Suppose that it was obtained via rule (2) from
orders < m). It is immediate that w(S 3 , C), w(S 4 , C) w(S, C) thus, using the T.I.H., both of Θ, Γ
′ ⊢ ∆, Φ and Θ, Γ ′′ ⊢ ∆, Φ are derivable. Applying to these two the rule (2) we derive Θ, Γ ⊢ ∆, Φ.
For applicable rules among (3)-(7) the argument is precisely like that for (2), except that it involves one premise.
3. Case where GLR was applied  still C is not the p.f. thus it is a strengthening formula. The premise, obtained with order < m, is of the form
Reapplying GLR to the last sequent, with a judicious choice of weakening/strengthening, yields
. Let now C be the p.f. in the last step of the derivation of Γ ⊢ C, ∆: Then Γ = Ξ, Ψ 1 while the premise has the following form, with
∀Ψ, Ψ, C ⊢ C, derived with order < m ( * )
Our key objective is to show that
is derivable. Once we have ( * 1 ) we can conclude the proof exactly as in [15] . Now, an application of GLR to ( * ), without weakening/strengthening parts, yields Ψ ⊢ C, derived with order m. ( * * )
This has not increased the induction variable (⋆).
We now turn to the analysis of the derivation of Θ, C ⊢ Φ by a quaternary induction (Q.I.) on its derivation order n. 15 For the basis, if this sequent is an axiom, then so is Γ, Θ ⊢ ∆, Φ since C is not atomic.
For the Q.I. step we only have the case that C is not the p.f. in the rule that derived Θ, C ⊢ Φ.
(i) Θ, C ⊢ Φ was obtained via an applicable rule, let us call it "R", among (2)- (7); say, it was (2). The premises have the forms S 3 = Θ ′ , C ⊢ Φ and S 4 = Θ ′′ , C ⊢ Φ, each derived with order < n. By the Q.I.H. Θ ′ , Γ ⊢ Φ, ∆ and Θ ′′ , Γ ⊢ Φ, ∆ are derivable. We can now apply rule R to them to derive Θ, Γ ⊢ Φ, ∆.
The cases for the other rules are similar, but with one premise. We note that for rule (6) we can employ 4.3, if necessary, to guarantee that the eigenvariable used does not appear free in Γ.
(ii) Rule (8) was used to derive Θ, C ⊢ Φ. The only possible scenarios are that the premise was either ∀Ω, Ω, D ⊢ D (subcase where C is a weakening formula), or ∀Ω, Ω, ∀C, C, D ⊢ D, for some D; either sequent being derived with order < n. Since weakening does not add to derivation order, without loss of generality we accept that the premise was ∀Ω, Ω, ∀C, C, D ⊢ D, derived with order < n.
( * * * )
We now embark on establishing ( * 1 ). Notice that by remarks following Definition 4.9, the set W( Ψ ⊢ C, C)  if not empty  will contain rules such as
We thus have two cases: Case w( Ψ ⊢ C, C) = 0. Let us set S = ∀Ψ, Ψ, C ⊢ C, and let U be a maximal classical cover of S in the proof. Let S ′ ∈ U . By Lemma 4.11(a), S ′ has the form Γ ′ , C ⊢ ∆ ′ . We have three subcases:
′ is the conclusion of a GLR inference of the form
where C is a weakening formula; cf. 4.9. Reusing the GLR differently, we obtain a proof for
′ is the conclusion of a GLR inference that has C as its p.f. (diagonal):
By ( * * ) via 4.4, we also have a proof of S ′′ = ∀Ψ, Ψ, Π, Λ ⊢ C, Ξ.
In all cases we succeeded to go from "the provable S ′ " to "the also provable S ′′ ", replacing C in the antecedent of S ′ by "∀Ψ, Ψ". By Lemma 4.11(b) we have a proof of ( * 1 ).
Case w( Ψ ⊢ C, C) > 0. We will derive ( * 1 ) once more. By the condition governing this case, we have at least one GLR inference above ( * ) that has the form J above. Let us concentrate on one such actual member of W( Ψ ⊢ C, C) and eliminate it while showing that we can still derive ( * ). Below we have a partial view of the path where J and Ψ ⊢ C belong in the proof. By Definition 4.9(4), C is not the same as B  the former cannot be the p.f.
.
Examine the following diagram where although we employ cuts we will explain that they can be simulated by the rules (1)- (8) alone. To reduce notational clutter we use the abbreviationΓ for "∀Γ, Γ". The π-labels are used to keep track of paths that are "copied-and-pasted".
• The conclusion of Cut 1 is derivable by the P.I.H.
• The conclusion of Cut 2 is derivable because GLR 1 does not contribute to the width (cf. 4.9(3)) since C is weakening, and thus w( Ψ, B ⊢ C, C) < original w( Ψ ⊢ C, C), allowing the use of the S.I.H.
• The conclusion of Cut 3 is derivable, again utilising the S.I.H. Notice that we removed the GLR J  depicted above at the end of the π 0 -path  from W( Ψ ⊢ C, C) and GLR 1 was not added. Thus we have reduced the original w( Ψ ⊢ C, C) by 1.
By reference to the proof in [15] , this concludes the present proof. ⊣
Comparing ML 3 and GLTS
In this section and later we use the notational convention
(ii) Γ ⊢ GTKS ∆ is short for "the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable in GTKS of [15] ".
The main theorem of this section is:
As in [15] , ∆ means A∈∆ A. Furthermore, Γ ⊢ X ∆ means that the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is derivable in X, if X is a Gentzen-style system. If Y is a Hilbert-style system, then Γ ⊢ Y A means that A is derivable in Y from hypotheses Γ.
Proof. 1. Since both share the same non-modal inference rules, we only need to show that GLTS can simulate the rule TR of GTKS.
Indeed, if ∀Γ, Γ ⊢ GLTS A then by 4.4, ∀Γ, Γ, A ⊢ GLTS A and thus (8) 
2. First assume the left hand side. The proof is by induction on the order of derivation.
is the conclusion of rule (6) applied to the premise Γ ⊢ GLTS ∆ ′ , A(a), then by the I.H. there are
. Now apply rule (6), 16 bearing in mind that L 1 (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a set of closed formulae, to obtain
(The other non-modal rules are done similarly.) c. If Σ, Γ ⊢ GLTS A, Ξ is the conclusion of rule (8) get L 1 (A 1 , . . . , A n ), ∀Γ, Γ ⊢ GTKS A → A and, via 4.4, ∀Ψ, Γ ⊢ GTKS A → A with the appropriate Ψ to make TR applicable. The latter then yields L 1 (A 1 , . . . , A n 
Next, assume the right hand side. Thus, we have
Now, 3.8 and the results in [15] 
Conversely,
Weak reflection
Toward a proof of 6.4 below, we state without proof the following two results (proved in [15] ):
Γ ⊢ ∆ implies that of Σ ⊢ ∆ with a proof that does not use the TR rule and employs only classical formulae.
Note. In loc. cit. the additional assumption that Γ is classical was never used in the proof of 6.2, thus it is not made here. Note. Again, there was a restriction in the statement of 6.3 as given in loc. cit. that Θ is classical. Given that the said restriction was not used anywhere in the proof, we have also lifted it in the proposition statement here. We emphasise, as it was also emphasised in loc. cit., that we do not require A to be classical either.
A, where Γ is classical, then Γ, Γ ⊢ ML 3 A as well. Note. A is not assumed to be classical. Proof. As in the proof of the previous proposition, we can deduce that ∃A 1 , . . . , A n : L 1 (A 1 , . . . , A n ) , ∀Γ, Γ ⊢ GTKS A. By 6.2 we obtain a classical proof of ∀Γ ⊢ GTKS A and hence (using 6.1) of Γ ⊢ M 3 A and, by 3.9, of Γ ⊢ ML 3 A.
17
⊣ Note. The converse is trivially true, as the assumption leads to Γ, Γ ⊢ ML 3 A and then we apply weak necessitation.
What about strong reflection and strong necessitation?
Neither p → p (strong reflection) nor p → p (strong necessitation) are provable within ML 3 , where p is a propositional variable: Note that if ⊢ ML 3 p → p then ⊢ GLTS p → p, hence p ⊢ GLTS p. By rule (8) we have ⊢ GLTS p and cutting it with the first sequent we obtain ⊢ GLTS p which is untenable: ⊢ p is neither a GLTS axiom, nor the consequence (denominator) of any rule. 17 It is quite simple to establish that any classical proof in M 3 is a classical proof in ML 3 .
Similarly, if ⊢ ML 3 p → p, then ⊢ GLTS p → p and hence p ⊢ GLTS p. Now, p ⊢ p is not a (GLTS) axiom and p cannot be the p.f. of any rule. Can p be such a p.f.? Well, if so, the premise must be of the form ∀Γ, Γ, p ⊢ p. Now Γ = ∅ since p ⊢ p is not derivable as we have just seen. But then the result  p ⊢ p, must contain at least one boxed formula to the left of ⊢, which is not the case. 
Semantic completeness of ML
Preliminaries
The standard semantic approach to modal logic is due to Kripke, who in 1959 introduced his "possible worlds" semantics [7] . This approach involves a frame, which is a pair, W, R , consisting of a non-empty set of possible worlds, W , and a binary accessibility relation, R, on W . Thus, for example, if w 1 and w 2 are possible worlds in W then we say that w 2 is accessible from w 1 iff w 1 Rw 2 .
We will use here a particular type of a Kripke frame, called a pointed Kripke frame (cf. [17] ), which is a triplet W, R, w 0 such that W, R is a frame and w 0 ∈ W is an R-minimum, that is, for all w ∈ W , w 0 = w or w 0 Rw.
A Kripke structure, M, is a pair ( W, R, w 0 , {(M w , I w ) : w ∈ W }) where W, R, w 0 is a pointed frame, and I w is an interpretation (on each w ∈ W  cf. [21] ) where M w is the domain of individuals associated with w. Basically, an interpretation (or sometimes, a valuation), I w , effects a truth-assignment, for each world w ∈ W , from closed formulae to the set {f, t}, so that for any closed formula A in w, I w (A) = t indicates that A is true in w. For all modal formulae B, not necessarily closed, B is true in w iff I w (∀B) = t. 18 We write, w |= B ( [17] writes w B and says "w forces B", terminology that we often use here).
For the record (cf. [21] ), each interpretation I w acts on a countable (finite or enumerable) domain M w associated with w, and is defined by induction on the complexity of closed formulae. The interesting points to note are two: one, for each w, I w (∀xB [x] ) is defined "locally"  that is, it is true iff all of B[x := i] (i ∈ M w ) are forced by w; two, I ω ( B) is defined "globally"  that is, it is true iff all w ′ satisfying wRw ′ force ∀B. We say that B is true in a structure M iff w 0 |= B  i.e., is forced by the "start-world" of the frame. We also say that the structure is a model of B and write |= M B. If, for some S, the foregoing holds for all B ∈ S, we call M a model of S and write |= M S. We write |= S  no subscript  iff every structure is a model of S. Semantic implication, S |= B, means that every model of S is a model of B as well.
The parallel notion (to truth) of validity of C in M  i.e., truth in all worlds of M  will not concern us since it is tantamount to the truth of C ∧ C at w 0 .
In what follows, and in analogy with the term well-founded, we will call a (binary) relation R converse well-founded iff its converse, R −1 , is well-founded. The next result is easily verifiable and well-known:
Proposition 7.1. Let W, R be a frame such that W is finite and R is transitive, then R is converse well-founded if and only if R is irreflexive. Now, returning to our development, it is known that GL is sound with respect to Kripke models equipped with converse well-founded accessibility relations.
It is also known that the converse to this property is true for K4 and GL: that is, if A is true in all (pointed) Kripke models whose accessibility relation is transitive (resp. transitive and converse well-founded), then A is a theorem of K4 (resp. of GL).
Reference [21] introduced the system (which we here call) M 3 + whose language and axioms are those of M 3 but is also equipped with the equality predicate, constant and function symbols, and also the axioms:
The cited paper showed the completeness of M 3 + with respect to all pointed Kripke frames whose accessibility relation is transitive.
In the next subsection, we build on techniques from loc. cit. and show that the system ML 3 + (which is obtained from ML 3 in the identical manner that M A from the remaining schemata. Since all the preliminary definitions and major parts of the proof in [21] apply without modification here, we will only elaborate on the parts where the two proofs diverge. Therefore, it is recommended that the readers familiarise themselves with the said paper.
Semantic completeness of ML
+
The following is borrowed from [21] . Note that the maximality of Γ implies that Γ is deductively closed:
The converse is, of course, trivial.
As in [21] , strong completeness  "for M A"  is proved by arguing the contrapositive: "If, for a closed A, T A, then there is a model M of T that falsifies A; I w 0 (A) = f ". This is taken as is from [21] for M 3 + and using the "standard trick" (cf. [17] ) of cutting down a K4 model into a finite GL model  adapted here to the first-order case  we will cut down a M 
Note. The aim in the last clause is not to miss any subformulae of A of the form E by virtue of them "hiding" in the scope of a ∀. It should be obvious that as all such subformulae are closed, we will get multiple identical copies of boxed subformulae, one for each t. Thus, any one, "canonically chosen", t will do as well, rather than taking all the (infinitely many) t.
It is immediate from 7.3 that:
pick a representative from each one of the remaining classes. We will call these world-representatives α, β, γ, etc. rather than w, w ′ , w 2 , etc. In particular, we will let α 0 = w 0 . Thus, A / ∈ α 0 . By 7.4, we obtain a finite set of worlds W r = {α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α m }. The corresponding domains are naturally called M α j . Now that we have cut down the set of worlds into a finite subset, our task is to redefine the accessibility relation R, to get an irreflexive and transitive relation, R on the set W r .
Definition 7.5 (The Accessibility Relation modulo a fixed A). Let β, γ ∈ W r . Then β Rγ iff i. For every B ∈ β that is a reduced subformula of A we have that ∀B and B are in γ. ii. There is some reduced subformula E of A such that E ∈ γ but E / ∈ β.
Note. With 7.5 recorded, we now further reduce W r , if applicable, by dropping all the α j that are not R-accessible from α 0 . We continue calling it "W r ".
Proposition 7.6. R is irreflexive and transitive.
Proof. If β Rβ for some β ∈ W r then, by 7.5, there must be some E ∈ β such that E / ∈ β which is impossible, therefore R is irreflexive. Now, assume that β Rγ Rδ for β, γ, δ in W r . Let B be a subformula of A such that B ∈ β. Then, by 7.5, B ∈ γ and thus {∀B, B} ⊆ δ. Now, since β Rγ there is some E ∈ γ such that E / ∈ β, but, because γ Rδ, we know that E ∈ δ. Thus, by definition, β Rδ. ⊣ We now state: For each α ∈ W r and any given reduced subformula B of A, we have
Proof. The proof will be done using induction on the modified complexity of a formula (cf. the proof of 4.12), a natural choice since we took ∀B to be a "subformula" of B.
The basis is the definition of I α for α ∈ W r as in (♦) and (♥) on p. 355. For the induction step we will only develop the two interesting cases, where B = ∀xC or B = C. The other cases are handled similarly to those in Lemma 6.3 of [21] .
1. B = ∀xC. This is argued precisely as in [21] : Let first I α (∀xC) = t. Then (Kripke semantics) it must be that I α (C[x := i]) = t for all i ∈ W α , and therefore, by the I.H., C[x := i] ∈ α for all such i. Now, if ∀xC / ∈ α, then, by maximality, ¬∀xC is in α; that is, ∃x¬C is. It follows that for some Henkin constant c ∈ M α , ¬C[x := c] is in α contradicting the latter's consistency.
Conversely, assume that ∀xC ∈ α. By Axiom (2) 2. B = C. Let first C ∈ α. To conclude that B is forced by α, examine the arbitrary β such that α Rβ  of course, if none such exists, then there is nothing to prove. As C is a subformula of our "reference", A, we have (cf. 7.5) that C and ∀C are in β. The I.H. applies to ∀C (lower modified complexity than B), and thus it is forced by (is true in) β. By Kripke semantics, I α ( C) = t.
Conversely, let (arguing contrapositively; cf. [21] ) C / ∈ α. Consider the set X = { C, ¬∀C} ∪ {∀D, D | D is a reduced subformula of A and D ∈ α}. We write X as   {∀D 1 , D 1 , . . . , ∀D r , D r , C, ¬∀C} and claim that it is consistent. If not, using propositional logic, we get:
By ⊢ ∀C → C (Axiom 2), the above yields:
Using weak necessitation (3.7), Axiom (5) and 3.5 we get:
Interpolation
This section considers the reverse of cut for GTKS and GLTS: If we can prove ⊢ A → B, then we can find a formula C  the interpolant of A and B  that bears some relationship to A and B, so that both ⊢ A → C and ⊢ C → B are provable. To make "bears some relationship" precise, let us indicate by the symbol A (cf. [14] ), the support of A, that is, the set of all free variables, Boolean variables and predicate letters appearing in A. For example, p = {p}, φa = {φ, a}, φa = {φ}, and ⊥ = ∅. We extend the symbol so that Σ = A∈Σ A .
We now state a general version of Craig's interpolation theorem. A partition of a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is an expression (Γ 1 , ∆ 1 ; Γ 2 , ∆ 2 ), where Γ = Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 and ∆ = ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 . A Γ i and a ∆ j can be empty, consistently however with the previous two equalities. Moreover, Γ 1 ∩ Γ 2 = ∅ = ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 .
Theorem 8.1 (Craig's interpolation theorem for GTKS and GLTS).
If Γ ⊢ X ∆ where X ∈ {GTKS, GLTS} then, for any chosen partition (Γ 1 , ∆ 1 ; Γ 2 , ∆ 2 ) of Γ ⊢ X ∆, an A (called an interpolant of {Γ 1 , ∆ 1 ; Γ 2 , ∆ 2 }) can be found satisfying:
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the order of derivation of Γ ⊢ ∆; however, since it follows very similar lines to the well-known Maehara-Takeuti proof [18] , it will be omitted. ⊣
Arithmetical soundness of ML
3
First, let us suppose that the (free) variables v 0 , v 1 , . . . and the (bound) variables x 0 , x 1 , . . . are common to the languages of ML 3 and of arithmetic. Second, let P r( · ) denote the provability predicate in Peano Arithmetic. Following [2] we define: Definition 9.1 (Realisation). 1. A realistion is a function * from a set of predicate letters to formulas (not necessarily atomic) in the language of arithmetic such that for all n, if π is an n-place predicate letter in the domain of * , then π * is a formula in which exactly the first n variables (i.e. v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) occur free. Proof. The proof can be done by induction on proofs in ML 3 (3.1): (Sketch) The interpretation, * , preserves tautologies since it commutes with Boolean connectives. Furthermore, the definition of * (and the fact the PA is a first order system itself) will ensure that the interpretation of any instance of (2)-(4) in 3.1 is provable in PA. Similarly, 9.3 implies that the interpretation of any instance of (5)- (7) is provable in PA, and 9.3(1) implies that interpretations of boxed instances of (1)- (7) are also provable in PA. Finally, * preserves implications by MP and Gen since it commutes with Boolean connectives and (practically) commutes with ∀. ⊣
Conclusions
We have introduced a first-order extension ML 3 of GL and an equivalent to it Gentzen-style system GLTS.
Unlike QGL, the "natural" first-order extension of GL, ML 3 supports cut-elimination (its Gentzen-style proxy is cut free). The precise technical demonstration that cut elimination fails in QGL is found in [1] and it has its root in the fact that the underlying first-order language, unlike ours, allows A to have free variables.
Moreover, we proved that ML 3 supports Craig Interpolation, its modal box simulates the classical provability ⊢ on classical formulae, is sound with respect to arithmetical interpretations, and is semantically complete with respect to converse well-founded transitive finite Kripke structures. Remains to be seen whether the latter property may prove to be a stepping stone toward proving ML 3 to be arithmetically complete  as it was in Solovay's proof for the case of GL  thus providing the first example of a usable first-order provability logic.
